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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

SUMMARY

COOPERv.DUPNIK:UNLAWFUL
INTERROGATION INVITES LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION

In Cooper v. Dupnik/ the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane,
held that an interrogation scheme employed by the Tucson Police Department and the Pima County Sheriff's Department intended to elicit a confession infringed on a suspect's constitutional right to remain silent. 2 The scheme was specifically
intended to compel involuntary testimony from a suspect by deliberately ignoring his repeated requests for an attorney.3
The Ninth Circuit also held that Cooper had stated a claim
sufficient for Section 1983 purposes.· In reaching this conclusion,
1. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (per Trott, J., with
whom Browning, J., Hug, J., Schroeder, J., Fletcher, J., Poole, J., Thompson, J., and
Wiggins, J., joined; Brunetti, J., and Leavy, J., dissenting).
2. [d. at 1223. The court held that the interrogation scheme violated the fifth
amendment. [d. at 1225. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that "no per·
son ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... "
U.S. CONST. amend V.
3. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1223.
4. [d. at 1242. See 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1988), providing in relevant part that "every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."

143

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 14

144

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:143

the court held that the admissibility of a confession will not dictate whether a valid Section 1983 claim has been established.
The Ninth Circuit's decision affirmed the district court's denial
of a motion .for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity. II
II. FACTS
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 7, 1986, Michael Cooper became a suspect in the
search for the Prime Time Rapist. e Cooper's fingerprints were
compared and mistakenly identified as latent fingerprints lifted
as evidence from one of the attack sights. 7 Cooper, who was on
probation for a fraud conviction,8 was formally arrested for the
series of rapes in Tucson. 9
Prior to Cooper's arrest, the Tucson Police Chief and the
Pima County Sheriff combined to form the Prime Time Rapist
Task Force (the "Task Force"}.lo The Task Force, a compilation
of experienced law-enforcement officers, was united to develop a
strategy for interrogating suspects in the Prime Time Rapist
case. l l The strategy consisted of ignoring the suspect's constitutional right to remain silent; refusing any request to speak with
an attorney; holding the suspect incommunicado; and pressuring
and questioning the suspect until he confessed. 12 The officers
knew that the confession generated from their tactics would be
inadmissible as evidence in a prosecutor's case in chief, but they
5. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1251.
6. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1228 (9th Cir. 1992). Beginning in 1984, and
extending through September of 1986, residents of Tucson, Arizona were beset by a se. ries of rapes, robberies and kidnapping. Id. at 1223. The Tucson Police Department and
the Pima County Sheriff's Department believed a single individual might be responsible
for the attacks. Id. That person became known as the "Prime Time Rapist." Id.
7. Id. at 1228. An identification technician for the Tucson Police Department decided, without authority, that Cooper might be a suspect. Id. The technician, who had
not conducted any substantial fingerprint work for at least six (and possibly nine) years,
compared the prints hastily and without following proper procedure. Id. His conclusion
was that a positive comparison existed, although he had difficulty making a match. Id.
The latent prints did not belong to Cooper. Id.
8. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1229 n.3.
9. Id. at 1229.
10. Id. at 1223.
11. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1224.
12.Id.
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hoped it would be admissible for impeachment purposes if the
suspect ever went to trial. 13 Furthermore, the officers hoped that
the confession would prevent the suspect from claiming innocence, and that it would hinder any possible insanity defense. 14
During the interrogation, Cooper was fully advised of his
Miranda rights.lI~ Cooper testified, however, that when the rights
were admi'nistered, he did not take them seriously.16 This was
the officers' intent, so that Cooper would talk with them. The
officers interrogated Cooper persistently, deliberately ignoring
his repeated requests for counsel. 17
Late in the interrogation, the detective designated as the
primary interrogator concluded that Cooper was innocent. IS
Even so, Cooper was eventually booked in the Pima County Jail,
still proclaiming his innocence. 19 The plan, though implemented
with great intensity, was ineffective in yielding a confession. 20
Cooper had been told by a female fingerprint expert (with
the Tucson Police Department) and the lead investigator that
13. [d. (emphasis added).
14. [d.

15. [d.; Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (requiring that suspects held in
custody be permitted to consult with an attorney prior to any interrogation, and allowing
a suspect to remain silent with or without an attorney). The officers ignored Cooper's
requests to contact an attorney. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1224. They doubted "very seriously"
if he would speak to them at all after he contacted an attorney. [d.
16. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1228. At the outset of the interview, which was recorded, the
officer fully advised Cooper of his Miranda rights, but deliberately turned the advisement into what he hoped Cooper would perceive as a joke. [d. The officer's ploy was
designed to make Cooper ignore the warnings, and begin to talk. [d. The officer intended
to undercut Cooper's constitutional right not to talk to the Task Force by complying
with Miranda's safeguards in form only, not in spirit or in substance. [d. For example,
the officer jokingly asked Cooper if Cooper had a rights card, and then said, "I could
read you my driver's license if you like." [d.
17. [d. at 1229. The record showed that Cooper was reduced to a state of agitation
and anxiety marked by tears and sobbing as he persistently maintained his innocence in
the face of the barrage of questioning. [d. at 1231. The record also contains evidence
indicating he was traumatized by this encounter and later suffered post-traumatic stress
syndrome. [d.
18. [d. The detective, a. hardened veteran, testified that Cooper's emotional state
caused him to conclude that Cooper was innocent. [d. The detective refused to interrogate Cooper any further, stating, "it was becoming clear to me that I could no longer
deny my feelings that we got the wrong guy." [d. (emphasis added).
19. [d. at 1232.
20. [d.
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the Task Force had identified a positive fingerprint match.21
Still, Cooper did not confess. 22 Later that evening, the female
fingerprint expert left the interrogation to double-check the earlier comparison made by the technician. 23 She concluded a mistake might have been made. 24 Her advice was initially ignored
by the first identification technician and his supervisor. 21i The
expert's concern eventually generated further examination of the
fingerprint evidence, and led the technicians to conclude that
they did not have a match. 28 This was reported to the leading
sergeant in the Sheriff's Department. 27
Nearly twenty-four hours after his arrest, Cooper was released. 28 During his incarceration, despite two attempts to contact an attorney, Cooper apparently had no contact with the
outside world, including his family.29
The evening of Cooper's arrest, the Sergeant told the media
that the Prime Time Rapist had been apprehended. 30 The next
day, the Chief of Police explained to the media that Cooper had
been misidentified by the crime lab. 31 The FBI subsequently
confirmed the mistake. 32 Only then did the Tucson Police Department publicly announce that Cooper had been cleared. 33
Cooper alleged that he and his family suffered serious personal and financial injury, and alleged nine causes of action
21. Id. Despite the detective's misgivings, the lead investigator wanted to secure a
confession. Id. The investigator summoned the fingerprint expert and told her, "I want
to try to force a confession out of this man." Id.
22.Id.
23.Id.
24. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1232. The expert testified that once removed from the
"pressure" generated by the Task Force, she reached this conclusion. Id.
25.Id.
26. Id. at 1233.
27. Id. at 1234.
28. Id. at 1233.
29.Id.
30. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1234. The Sergeant made this statement knowing that
Cooper did not fit the physical description of the rapist given by the victims of the two
rapes in question. Id. His superior also did not believe Cooper was responsible for these
incidents. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The confirmation of the mismatch came two months after Cooper's release.
Id.
33. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1234.
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and nine causes of action under state
tort law. 34 He named as defendants the law enforcement agencies, the individual officers and their employers. 311
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on six of the federal causes of action. The court
reasoned that the defendants successfully asserted the defense
of qualified immunity.36 The defendants appealed from the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Cooper's claims of
(1) denial of right to counsel and right to remain silent, (2) injury to reputation and property interests, and (3) conspiracy.37
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit focused on two issues: the denial of
the right to counsel and of the right to remain silent. 38
B.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The defendants argued that the record contained clear evidence that they were entitled as a matter of law to the complete
defense of qualified immunity as defined by the United States
Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth. 39 They further argued
34. [d. The federal civil rights claims in Cooper's second amended complaint were:
denial of right to counsel and right to remain silent; false arrest; false imprisonment;
improper training and procedures; injury to reputation and property interests; invasion
of privacy; illegal search and seizure (residence); illegal search and seizure (automobile);
and conspiracy. [d. The state claims were not at issue on appeal. [d.
35. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1234.
36. [d at 1235.
37. [d. The court left intact the rulings of the district court as to the other counts.
[d.
38. [d. This case was originally heard on appeal by a Ninth Circuit three judge
panel, which reversed all counts except a state defamation claim. [d. See also Cooper v.
Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1991). Cooper successfully petitioned for a rehearing en
bane. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1223.
39. [d. at 1235. The court discussed the standard of review as well as the test to be
applied for determining whether appellants are entitled to qualified immunity:
An appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's
claim of immunity need not consider the plaintiff's version of
the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question
of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged
actions or, in cases where the district court has denied summary judgement for the defendant on the ground that even
under the defendant's version of the facts the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law, whether the law clearly
proscribed the actions the defendant claims he took.
[d. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985».
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that continuing the interrogation in spite of Cooper's· request for
counsel merely violated the safeguards set out in Miranda,4.0 and
did not violate the Fifth Amendment substantive right to remain silent. 41 The defendants argued that Cooper could not
bring a claim under Section 1983 since they did not violate the
Constitution.4.2 The defendants emphasized that Section 1983 requires a violation of a "right ... secured by the Constitution"
before imposing civil liability.4.S Furthermore, the defendants
claimed that the only consequence of disregarding Miranda was
that the evidence obtained might be inadmissible. 44
The district court's ruling turned mainly on whether the defendants deprived Cooper of a constitutional right. The district
court concluded that no such violation occurred, reasoning that
Miranda warnings are merely procedural safeguards and are not
mandatory.4.11
On appeal, a three judge Ninth Circuit panel concluded that
Cooper did not state a cause of action under Section 1983. 46 The
panel rejected Cooper's claim on four additional grounds. First,
it held that Cooper's Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated because Cooper did not confess to a crime. 4.7 Second, the
panel overlooked Miranda's primary holding that the constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination (the right to
remain silent) is applicable to suspects in police custody;4.S as a
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1235.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1236. Besides stating that Miranda warnings are not consti-

tutionally mandated, the district court held there was no civil liability based upon the
failure of the police to issue Miranda warnings. [d. (citing Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d
1520 (9th Cir. 1991)).
46. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1236 (citing Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1527). The panel noted that
although his request for counsel was not honored, the Miranda warnings and rights are
not themselves constitutionally mandated. [d. The panel stated that they are procedural
safeguards, or prophylactic measures, to ensure that the fifth amendment right against
compulsory incrimination is not violated. [d. The panel observed that all out-of-circuit
cases held that a plaintiff may not, as a matter of law, maintain a § 1983 action based on
the failure to issue Miranda warnings. . . Since Miranda requirements are not a constitutional prerequisite, the panel concluded that their violation cannot form the basis of a
§ 1983 suit. [d.
47. Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1529. .
48. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1236 (citing Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1527 n.17).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/14

6

Kepnes: Criminal Procedure

1993]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

149

result, the panel rejected Cooper's Fifth Amendment claim. 49
Third, the panel determined that Cooper's substantive due process rights were not violated because the Task Force's conduct
did not "shock the conscience".110 And fourth, the panel decided
that all appellants were protected from suit by the doctrine of
qualified immunity. III The Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, disagreed with the majority of the original panel on each of these
issues. 1I2
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

COOPER'S STA~EMENTS

Noting that Cooper made statements which could and probably would have been used against him had he gone to trial,1I3
the Ninth Circuit held that it was irrelevant that the Task Force
never secured a confession. 1I4 The court held further that
Cooper's statements hindered any insanity defense and therefore
supported a constitutional violation. 1I11
The court concluded, based on Miranda, that Cooper's
statements were sufficient to constitute a breach of his right to
remain silent. liS The court reasoned that Miranda does not distinguish between statements which are direct confessions and
statements which are partial admissions of an offense, since both
types of statements are incriminating.1i7
B.

FIFTH AMENDMENT

The court held that the Task Force's motive was irrelevant,
and concluded that its attempt to force Cooper's confession was
49.Id.
50.Id.
51. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1237. The panel stated "there are simply no § 1983 substantive due process cases with similar facts." Id.
52. Id. at 1236.
53. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1237 (9th Cir. 1992). Cooper admitted slapping his wife, and that he often left his home, unaccompanied at night, sometimes for
hours at a time. Id.
54.Id.
55. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1238.
56.Id.
57. Id. at 1238 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77).
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an attempt to compel him to be a witness against himself. liS The
court reasoned that Miranda extends the Fifth Amendment
right to interrogations in police stations as well as the courtroom
itself.1i9 The court emphasized that Miranda warnings are not
prophylactic safeguards, but protect a substantive constitutional
right-the right to remain silent. 6o Furthermore, the court interpreted Miranda as requiring the right to consult counsel prior to
and during interrogation. 61 The court noted that the rationale of
Miranda is relevant to the present case as in-custody interrogations can be overpowering to the suspect's will, thus the right to
remain silent needs protection throughout the interrogation. 62
Once the accused has requested counsel, the interrogation must
cease. 6S
The court concluded that if police conduct departed from
prophylactic safeguards, such behavior was an abridgment of
constitutional rights. The court emphasized that the nature of
the interrogation made Cooper's statements compelled and in58.Id.
59. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1239. The Court said:
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created
for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the
will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of
intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but
it is equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of
our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual
may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Today, then,
there can be no doubt that the fifth amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to
protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled
to incriminate themselves. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58 (emphasis added).
60.Id.
61. Id.
62. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1240 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70). Even preliminary
advice given to the accused by his own attorney can swiftly be overcome by the secret
interrogation process. Thus the need for counsel to protect the fifth amendment privilege
is not merely the right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
469-70.
63. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1240. See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), in
which the Supreme Court referred to Miranda's "rigid rule that an accused's request for
an attorney is per se an invocation of his fifth amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease." Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1240 (citing Fare, 442 U.S. at 719).
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voluntary.64 Cooper's repeated requests for counsel were treated
with indifference and he was continuously badgered in order to
force a confession. 6& The court reasoned that since the right
against self-incrimination was designed to protect against this
type of police misconduct, Cooper had a Fifth Amendment cause
of action under Section 1983. 66

C.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The Ninth Circuit maintained that the coercive police action alone violated due process; the actual use or attempted use
of the coerced statement was not necessary to complete the affront to the Constitution. 67 The court held that Cooper's civil
rights cause of action was not contingent on Cooper being formally charged, nor on his statements being offered as evidence. 68
The court observed that the detrimental use of the coerced
statements becomes relevant when determining damages. 69
The Ninth Circuit also held that a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not require physical coercion.70 The court reasoned that the law governing coerced confessions is clear; the Fourteenth Amendment demands
that confessions be the voluntary product of a free and unconstrained will. 71 The court concluded that Cooper's statements to
the Task Force did not meet this standard. He was emotionally
worn down, stressed and filled with a sense of helplessness and
fear. 72 Statements made under these conditions are clearly forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. 73.
64. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1241 (citing Miranda, 634 U.S. at 456-58). It is obvious that
such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the
individual to the will of his examiner. . . no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1242.
65. Id. at 1243. The approach was described by an officer as "hammering," and the
questioning was harsh and unrelenting. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206
(1960) (recognizing that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of
the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition).
66. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1244.
67. Id. at 1245.
68.Id.
69.Id.
70.Id.
71. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1247.
72. Id. at 1248.'
73.Id.
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THE POLICE CONDUCT "SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE"

The Ninth Circuit held that Cooper could also claim that
the defendants' behavior "shocks the conscience," in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, providing him with a second cause
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7• The Ninth Circuit concluded
that although police brutality is the most frequent example of a
substantive due process violation, other violations can occur.711
The court recognized that the police behavior in this case' was
intended to prevent Cooper from testifying, and that the Task
Force attempted to utilize unlawful tactics to use Cooper's statemerits to impeach him and deny him use of an insanity defense. 76 This deliberate ignorance of constitutional standards infringed on Cooper's inalienable rights, and is thus a "shock to
the system."77

E.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Once determining that the Task Force violated Cooper's
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the court turned to
the question of whether the Task Force could successfully rely
on qualified immunity as a defense. 78
The doctrine of qualified immunity was designed to ensure
that officials would not be "chilled" in the proper exercise of
their public duties, but is inapplicable when an official knowingly violates the law. 79 The standard for determining whether
the defense is applicable is objective. Officials will be liable 'when
their behavior falls below the reasonable person standard. 80 The
74. [do See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) which outlawed all police
conduct that "offends those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous
offenses." [do at 172.
75. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1249.
76. [do at 1250.
77. [d.
78. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1251.
79. [do (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524). "Under the standard of qualified immunity

... [an official) will be entitled to immunity so long as his actions do not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have
known. This standard will not allow him to carry out his ... functions wholly free from
concern for his personal liability . . . Where an official could be expected to know that
his conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesi'
tate .... " [d.
80. Cooper, at 1251. See supra note 63 setting forth the standard for applying the
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depositions of the Task Force members show that they knew
they were violating Cooper's Constitutional rights, yet they consciously continued with their actions. 81 The court thus concluded that the defendants violated Cooper's rights and met the
criteria set forth in Mitchell. 82 The qualified immunity defense
is therefore inapplicable. 83

F.

CONCURRENCE

According to the majority, the violation of Cooper's Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent gave rise to Section 1983 liability.84 In contrast, the concurrence noted that the decision in
this case does not expand liability under Section 1983 to include
ordinary Miranda rights violations. 811 Because a suspect does not
have a constitutional right to Miranda warnings, the rights are
simply a prophylactic device designed to protect the right to remain silent. 8s The concurrence recognized that in this case, however, Cooper's request for counsel was a per se invocation of the
constitutional right to remain silent. 87 Thus, the violation of
Cooper's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and not the
Miranda violations, gave rise to Section 1983 liability.88

G.

DISSENT

The dissent emphasized that Cooper's statements would
have been suppressed in any criminal proceeding. 89 Cooper could
not incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment
once the evidence was suppressed. 90 The dissent argued that it is
the use of coerced statements that constitutes a Fifth Amendment violation. 91 Since there was no use of the statements, there
doctrine of qualified immunity.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court further concluded that it was irrelevant that the appellants hoped
that the confession would be deemed voluntary. This is not a subjective standard. Id.
84. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1253.
85. Id. at 1252.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1253.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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was no constitutional violation. 92 Thus, the dissent argued, there
is no remedy available to Cooper under Section 1983. 93
The dissent also argued that Cooper did not state a valid
Claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because the police did
not "shock the conscience" with their conduct. 94 Although the
behavior might have been extreme, the dissent stated that it was
hardly "sophisticated psychological torture,"as the majority insists. 911 The dissent argued that there can be no Section 1983 liability when police conduct does not violate substantive due
process. 96

v.

CONCLUSION

In Cooper v. Dupnik,97 the Ninth Circuit held that the deliberate denial of a suspect's requests for counsel and continuous
interrogation specifically intended to compel a confession violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 98 The court held
that any violation by the police is complete at the time of the
offending behavior, and such behavior "shocks the conscience"
because it denies a citizen the right against self-incrimination. 99
The court emphasized that when officials deliberately choose to
ignore the law in favor of their own methods, they attempt to
render the Constitution useless, and will be found liable under
Section 1983. 100
Stacey L. Kepnes*

92. [d.
93. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1253.
94. [d. at 1255.

95. [d. The dissent did not defend the police techniques, but noted that Cooper was
not physically assaulted, nor was he deprived of sleep, nor was he subjected to incommunicado interrogation over a period of days. [d. His interrogation lasted only four hours
and consisted of rough questioning by the police. [d.
96. [d. at 1256.
97. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992).
98. [d. at 1251.
99. [d. at 1252.
100. [d.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995.
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